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The written Constitution does not specify how treaties are to be 
terminated any more than it specifies how laws are to be terminated.  So what 
process is required to terminate treaties?  Back in the 1800s, the consensus 
among the political branches was that action by one or both houses of 
Congress was required, with debate centering on whether the appropriate 
action was a congressional statute, presidential action combined with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, or either of these approaches.
1
 
But today the constitutional practice is very different.  The President 
now claims and regularly exercises the power to terminate treaties without 
any form of congressional approval, at least where this termination accords 
with international law.  Presidents have unilaterally taken the United States 
out of many treaties, with the two most controversial instances being 
President Carter’s termination of our mutual defense treaty with Taiwan and 
President George W. Bush’s termination of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
with Russia.  In essence, constitutional practice has flipped from requiring 
congressional approval for treaty termination to now almost never including 
it. 
In Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, Curtis Bradley explores 
when, how, and why this shift has taken place.
2
  He comprehensively 
examines the practice of treaty termination from the Founding to the present 
 
 * Assistant Professor, Rutgers School of Law (Camden).  I thank Beth Stephens for comments. 
1.  Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 TEXAS L. REV. 773, 789–
90, 791–92, 793–96 (2014). 
2. See Bradley, supra note 1. 
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day, looking over time at how treaties have been terminated and at the 
accompanying constitutional analysis used by government actors and 
scholars.  Professor Bradley concludes that, starting around the end of the 
nineteenth century, intermittent, low-stakes actions by the Executive Branch 
in relation to treaty termination laid the foundation for broader claims of a 
presidential power to terminate treaties.  From the 1930s onward, presidents 
increasingly exercised this power with regard to relatively uncontroversial 
termination decisions that received little, if any, attention from Congress. 
President Carter both relied on and further cemented this accrued practice in 
his high-stakes decision with respect to the Taiwan treaty. 
By itself, Professor Bradley’s description of the changing constitutional 
practice of treaty termination is an important contribution.  His account is an 
exceptionally comprehensive, deeply researched, and evenhanded appraisal; 
one that will inform any further debates regarding treaty termination in the 
political branches (as well as in the courts, should they ever treat the issue as 
justiciable).  There are other accounts out there,
3
 but this one is the most 
authoritative to date. 
Professor Bradley goes further, however, in relating this account of 
treaty termination to broader themes of constitutional construction.  This 
further contribution has two significant components.  First, Professor Bradley 
places his account of treaty termination within a descriptive theory of how 
historical practice shapes constitutional norms.  In prior work with Trevor 
Morrison, Professor Bradley developed a theory of how constitutional 
practice in the political branches tends to work to the President’s advantage 
over time.
4
  Here, Professor Bradley offers treaty termination as an example 
of this theory in action and further illustrates how the constitutional evolution 
predicted by this theory can lie somewhere between gradualism and 
punctuated equilibrium.  Second, Professor Bradley reflects on the legitimacy 
of such constitutional developments.  He focuses more on identifying 
normative pros and cons than on assigning them weight, but as a descriptive 
matter he accepts that the President does indeed now have the constitutional 
power to terminate treaties when this termination complies with international 
law. 
Professor Bradley thus combines a narrowly focused doctrinal account 
of treaty termination with a broad theory of historical practice in 
constitutional interpretation.  I am largely sympathetic to this approach.  But 
I think Professor Bradley’s account underplays a crucial middle layer that 
mediates and shapes the connections between treaty termination and the 
 
3. E.g., DAVID GRAY ADLER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE TERMINATION OF TREATIES 
(1986); David A. Schnitzer, Note, Into Justice Jackson’s Twilight:  A Constitutional and Historical 
Analysis of Treaty Termination, 101 GEO. L.J. 243, 264–69 (2012). 
4. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation 
of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012). 
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historical gloss.  This is the role that the foreign relations context of treaty 
termination has played in enabling the dramatic constitutional change that 
took place with regard to it.  
In the first Part of this Response, I describe how the constitutional 
change that took place in treaty termination falls within three more general 
themes in the foreign affairs context.  These are (1) the role of international 
law in constitutional interpretation; (2) the twentieth-century rise of 
executive power; and (3) the reluctance of the courts to interfere with 
executive decision making.  These themes are acknowledged in Professor 
Bradley’s article, but I believe they deserve even more emphasis. 
In the second Part of this Response, I argue that the changing 
constitutional practice in treaty termination bears little resemblance to Justice 
Frankfurter’s articulation of the “historical gloss.”  Rather, this practice 
reveals a far more dramatic shift than Justice Frankfurter would view as 
legitimate.  I suggest that the foreign affairs context of treaty termination is 
crucial to understanding why such a significant shift in practice has been 
allowed to occur.  In my view, it is an instance of what Professor Bradley has 
elsewhere called “foreign affairs exceptionalism”—specialized constitutional 
practice in the context of foreign affairs.
 5
  Professor Bradley has been critical 
of foreign affairs exceptionalism, but his account of treaty termination may 
serve to support its validity.  For foreign affairs exceptionalism is itself a 
creature of historical practice.  Therefore, to the extent that historical practice 
serves as a descriptive—and potentially normative—basis of constitutional 
meaning, it can ground not only our current practice of treaty interpretation, 
but also foreign affairs exceptionalism more generally. 
I. Treaty Termination in Context 
What caused the practice of treaty termination to change?  Here, I link 
this change to three broader themes in foreign relations law: the role of 
international law in constitutional interpretation, the rise of executive power 
in the first half of the twentieth century, and the reluctance of courts to 
challenge executive decision making.  These are all themes that appear in 
Professor Bradley’s article, but they do so largely in passing, in contrast to 
the attention given to his broader theory of presidential accruals of power in 
the face of congressional acquiescence. 
 
5. E.g., Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-
Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1582–86 (2003) [hereinafter Bradley, International 
Delegations]; Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1089, 1096–97 (1999) [hereinafter Bradley, Foreign Affairs]. 
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A. International Law in Constitutional Interpretation.   
Like foreign relations law more generally, treaty termination involves 
issues both of international law and of U.S. domestic law.  One can regard 
the boundary between these two areas of law as sealed, with the international 
and constitutional law issues having no influence on each other.  Or, instead, 
one can regard this boundary as porous, with the international law issue 
influencing the constitutional one and, sometimes perhaps, vice versa.
6
 
Professor Bradley frames his account in a way that initially suggests a 
sealed boundary.  He describes the rules of international law on treaty 
termination but emphasizes that international law does not address the 
process by which the United States makes its treaty termination decisions.
7
  
Yet, in reading his historical account, the impression of a far more porous 
boundary develops.  International law appears to have influenced the 
resolution of the domestic constitutional question in at least two ways. 
First, as Professor Bradley notes,
8
 the fact that international law often 
authorized treaty termination (as well as related issues like treaty suspension) 
made the constitutional issue appear murky and therefore reduced resistance 
to constitutional change.  The fact that treaty termination decisions by the 
President complied with international law—and sometimes prevented 
conflicts between congressional statutes or policy and international law—
offered a mantle of legitimacy that both explained presidential action and 
helped forestall criticism of it.  As treaties increasingly came to include 
discretionary withdrawal clauses, the Executive Branch could frame 
withdrawal “as a mere normal incident in the conduct of foreign relations.”
9
  
In essence, international law served as, what I have elsewhere called, a 
source of “extra-constitutional” legitimacy—a justification for presidential 
action that headed off political opposition that could otherwise have arisen 
around the constitutional question.
10
 
Second, at points along the way, the Executive Branch explicitly relied 
on international law to legitimize its doctrinal view of executive 
constitutional power.  Consider the following passage from a 1936 
Department of State Memorandum: 
 
6. This concept of a porous doctrinal boundary between international and domestic law 
resembles the political science concept of a “two-level game” whereby international negotiating 
conditions can influence domestic ones and vice versa.  See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and 
Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427, 433–34 (1988). 
7. Bradley, supra note 1, at 776–79. 
8. Id. at 830–31 (“The overlay of a mix of international law rules governing treaty termination, 
as well as potential distinctions between suspension and termination . . . have also made presidential 
unilateralism relating to the issue a more complicated target to assess and criticize.”). 
9. 2 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED 
BY THE UNITED STATES 1520 (2d rev. ed. 1945). 
10. Jean Galbraith, International Law and the Domestic Separation of Powers, 99 VA. L. REV. 
987, 998–1001 (2013). 
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A contention that the action of the President in denouncing a treaty must 
be submitted to either the Senate or the Congress for ratification 
presupposes that action by one or the other of them is necessary to give 
validity to the action of the President.  This argument, however, would 
seem to be questionable for the reason that when the President has given 
notice of the desire of this Government to terminate a treaty, the failure 
of the Congress or the Senate to approve does not alter the situation.  
The notice has already been given and the foreign government may 
decline to accept a withdrawal of such notice.
11
 
 
This passage elides the international and constitutional law questions, in 
essence bootstrapping the justification for the President’s constitutional 
power to terminate treaties onto the methods recognized by international law 
for terminating treaties.  Along these same lines, the Executive Branch relied 
on the President’s sovereign power as the sole organ of foreign relations—a 
doctrine that is largely a creature of international law
12
—to justify his 
constitutional power to terminate treaties without congressional approval.
13
  
Indeed, at times the Executive Branch even mischaracterized doctrinal 
precedents in international law as doctrinal precedents in constitutional law 
in order to justify its constitutional position.
14
 
Such uses—and sometimes misuses—of international law to accrue 
constitutional power to the Executive Branch are common in foreign 
relations law.  I have shown elsewhere how they help account for the rise in 
presidential power in the areas of recognition, war powers, and sole 
executive agreements—all of which, like treaty termination, are aspects of 
foreign relations law.
15
 
 
11. Memorandum from Green Haywood Hackworth, Legal Advisor of the Dep’t of State,  
Abrogation of Treaties (Jan. 27, 1936), quoted in 5 GREEN HAYWOOD HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 328 (1943). 
12. Galbraith, supra note 10, at 1012–15. 
13. See, e.g., Letter from Robert Moore, Acting Sec’y of State, to Fred Biermann, U.S. Rep. 
(Aug. 19, 1939), quoted in 5 GREEN HAYWOOD HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
331–32 (1943) (rooting the President’s power to terminate treaties in general concepts of 
sovereignty and in the Supreme Court’s Curtiss-Wright decision, which emphasized the sole organ 
powers of the President). 
14. See Bradley, supra note 1, at 796–97, 806 n.186 (describing how the Executive Branch 
points to treaties that ended during the Madison and Wilson Administrations as historical precedents 
for the constitutional power of the President to terminate treaties when, in fact, these treaties were 
terminated based on the international laws and customs of the time). 
15. See generally Galbraith, supra note 10.  Interestingly, international law continues to play a 
robust role in determining the boundary of what the President can and cannot do in treaty 
termination, see Bradley, supra note 1, at 823 (quoting the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations 
Law as providing the closest description of the current state of the U.S. constitutional law regarding 
treaty termination), while in these other areas of foreign relations law its role is now obscured, see 
Galbraith, supra note 10, at 1033–42. 
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B. The Twentieth-Century Rise in Executive Power.   
The first half of the twentieth century brought about a sharp rise in the 
President’s foreign affairs powers.  This rise has many possible causes, 
including the energetic presidencies of Theodore and later Franklin 
Roosevelt; the growing importance of the United States on the world stage;  
the increased interconnectedness of world affairs; and the Supreme Court’s 
embrace of executive foreign affairs powers in Curtiss-Wright and related 
cases.
16
 
The shift in constitutional practice in treaty termination can be seen as 
one piece of this broader picture.  Professor Bradley documents this shift as 
falling squarely within this same time period, as the caveated precursors to 
unilateral executive treaty termination are succeeded by straightforward 
exercise of that power beginning in 1927, and increasing rapidly during the 
FDR Administration.
17
  Indeed, this increased power with regard to treaty 
termination not only occurred amid a general expansion of the President’s 
foreign affairs power but also within a specific expansion of his powers 
related to international agreements.  During this same time period, the reach 
of sole executive agreements entered into by the President increased 
markedly;
18
 the President first asserted and exercised the power to use ex post 
congressional–executive agreements as a substitute for Article II treaties 
(thus enabling the United States to enter into major agreements where 
majority support in the Senate fell below the two-thirds mark),
19
  and the 
Supreme Court planted the seeds of its current, substantial practice of 
deference to the Executive Branch on treaty interpretation.
20
 
C. The Reluctance of Courts to Interfere with Executive Decision Making.   
The third theme from broader foreign relations law reflected in the 
history of treaty termination is the traditional reluctance of the Supreme 
Court to interfere with presidential decision making in the foreign affairs 
 
16. See generally David Gartner, Foreign Relations, Strategic Doctrine, and Presidential 
Power, 63 ALA. L. REV. 499 (2012); David Golove, From Versailles to San Francisco: The 
Revolutionary Transformation of the War Powers, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1491 (1999); G. Edward 
White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1 
(1999). The President’s domestic powers of course increased during this time period as well, but 
with this increase coming largely through explicit congressional delegations. 
17. Bradley, supra note 1, at 805–07. 
18. See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C. 
L. REV. 133 (1998) (documenting a number of executive agreements entered into during the first 
half of the twentieth century). 
19. See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799, 
805–08 (1995) (discussing how several early twentieth century scholars intensely argued for the 
interchangeability between congressional–executive agreements and treaties). 
20. Michael P. Van Alstine, Treaties in the Supreme Court:  1901–1945, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT:  CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 191, 217 (Davis L. Sloss, Michael 
D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge eds. 2011). 
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context.  Professor Bradley mentions this theme,
21
 and it is on evident display 
in Goldwater v. Carter.  Confronted with the chance to address the 
President’s constitutional power to terminate treaties, the Court squarely 
declined to do so (though without a majority for any single theory of non-
justiciability).
22
  The Court’s reluctance here contrasts markedly with its 
willingness to interfere with historical practice in the domestic context, as 
illustrated a few years later in I.N.S. v. Chadha.
23
 
II. Treaty Termination, Foreign Affairs, and Historical Gloss 
In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Justice Frankfurter defended 
constitutional practice as a “gloss” on executive power where this practice 
revealed “the way the [constitutional] framework has consistently operated” 
and “[d]eeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government.”
24
  
Interestingly, the historical practice on treaty termination explored here by 
Professor Bradley bears little resemblance to this gloss.  This practice does 
not reveal deeply embedded, consistent interpretations, but rather striking 
departures from early interpretations. 
What do we make of this?  As a descriptive matter, Professor Bradley’s 
account makes clear that historical practice can sometimes lead to truly 
dramatic shifts in the balance of power between branches.  His work with 
Professor Morrison helps explain why the Executive usually gains in these 
shifts, but it does not provide much fine-tuned guidance as to which shifts 
will happen and which ones will not happen. 
I suggest here that the fact that treaty termination is a matter of foreign 
relations law is crucial to understanding why such a dramatic shift in practice 
has been tolerated.  It is an instance of what Professor Bradley has described 
elsewhere as “foreign affairs exceptionalism,” meaning “the idea that foreign 
affairs powers should be subject to different, and generally more relaxed, 
constitutional restraints than domestic powers.”
25
  Professor Bradley roots 
this doctrine largely in developments from 1920–1940, although his 
discussions of its development have focused on Supreme Court decisions like 
Curtiss-Wright rather than changes in Executive Branch practice.
26
 
The rise of unilateral presidential power to terminate treaties bears clear 
indicia of foreign affairs exceptionalism. The themes outlined in the prior 
section—of entanglement with international law issues, of the growth of 
executive foreign affairs powers, and of judicial reluctance to interfere with 
 
21. See Bradley, supra note 1, at 785–86. 
22. See generally Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). 
23. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).  As Justice White noted in dissent, the holding did implicate some 
foreign relations law statutes.  Id. at 968 (White, J., dissenting). 
24. 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
25. Bradley, International Delegations, supra note 5, at 1582–83. 
26. See id. at 1583. 
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the Executive’s foreign affairs decision making—are themes that seem 
collectively necessary to the constitutional change in treaty making, and that 
are largely particular to the foreign affairs context.  Indeed, the very time 
period that Professor Bradley associates with the rise of foreign affairs 
exceptionalism—the 1920s to the 1940s—is exactly the same time period in 
which he grounds the shift in practice on treaty termination.  The same 
principles that animated the Curtiss-Wright decision of deference to the 
Executive’s powers on foreign affairs and emphasis on functionalism are on 
display in the shift to unilateral presidential power to terminate treaties, and 
the decision in Curtiss-Wright itself served to reinforce this reasoning.
27
 
Understanding the change in treaty termination as foreign affairs 
exceptionalism helps explain why practice in treaty termination has taken 
such a different turn from practice in statutory termination.  The practice in 
treaty termination has changed dramatically; the practice in statutory 
termination has not.  While the Constitution’s text might offer stronger basis 
for presidential termination of treaties than of statutes,
28
 the historical 
practice explored by Professor Bradley suggests that the foreign affairs 
context of treaty termination played an essential role.  This context has made 
presidents more comfortable pushing the boundaries of past precedents; 
Congress more tolerant of these developments; and the Supreme Court more 
wary of intervening. 
In my view, the change in practice in treaty termination is better 
explained by foreign affairs exceptionalism than by Professor Bradley and 
Morrison’s generalized constitutional theory of how historical practice can 
develop.  Of course, the answer is not a purely binary one.  Professor Bradley 
notes the role of foreign affairs exceptionalism in explaining the shift in 
practice in treaty termination, observing that, “when constitutional 
controversies implicate foreign relations,” themes of practice-based 
presidential accruals of power “are particularly common.” 
29
  Conversely, I 
accept that these themes can be found in certain other areas of the separation 
of powers, of which Professor Bradley suggests some examples.
30
  What 
makes the foreign affairs context unique is the frequency, scale, and 
importance of practice-based shifts in favor of presidential power. 
 
27. See Letter from Robert Moore, supra note 13. 
28. See Kristen E. Eichensehr, Treaty Termination and the Separation of Powers, 53 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 247, 250–51 (2013) (noting the use of parallels to the Appointments Clause). 
29. Bradley, supra note 1, at 785; see also Bradley & Morrison, supra note 4, at 461–76 (using 
two, out of a total of three, foreign affairs examples to illustrate their theory of practice-based 
constitutional change). 
30. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 4, at 476–84 (discussing the power to remove officials 
whose appointment the Senate has advised and consented to, although noting that this example 
involves more judicial involvement than in the foreign affairs examples they offer); see also 
Bradley, supra note 1, at 785–86 (offering examples of the pocket veto, the pardon power, and 
executive privilege as areas where executive practice matters). 
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Indeed, foreign affairs exceptionalism is itself an instance of practice-
based constitutional development.  The historical practice that has led to 
unilateral presidential power to terminate treaties—and to stronger 
presidential war powers, recognition powers, and powers to make 
international agreements and set U.S. foreign policy—has also led more 
generally to specialized treatment of foreign affairs law within our 
constitutional framework.  An important question today is whether foreign 
relations law should have such specialized treatment or instead be 
approached in the same way as purely domestic constitutional issues.  In the 
past, Professor Bradley has been wary of foreign affairs exceptionalism.
31
  
Yet if one accepts that historical practice gives rise to valid constitutional 
interpretations (even if reserving judgment on the normative desirability of 
shifts in historical practice),
32
 then historical practice can serve as a 
justification for foreign affairs exceptionalism.  The sanction of history lies 
over foreign affairs exceptionalism, just as it does over the narrower matter 
of practice in treaty termination. 
Of course, neither the current practice of treaty termination nor foreign 
affairs exceptionalism more generally may be well suited to the needs of the 
present day.  Professor Bradley has criticized foreign affairs exceptionalism 
as out of date in light of “the erosion in recent years of the distinction 
between domestic and foreign affairs.”
33
  The Supreme Court’s recent 
assertiveness in cases involving foreign affairs suggests that a majority of the 
Justices may be sympathetic to this view.  A recent, striking example is the 
Court’s decision that the political question doctrine does not apply to the 
recognition power—a decision which nowhere cited Justice Rehnquist’s 
plurality opinion in Goldwater v. Carter and nowhere suggested that the 
foreign affairs context of the case mattered.
34
  I think that there is still 
something to this distinction, and that, in any event, the best solution to its 
erosion may involve changes to both traditionally domestic and foreign 
affairs constitutional principles rather than only to the latter.  If one accepts 
that foreign affairs exceptionalism should end, however, then this would 
suggest that the doctrines that have developed through foreign affairs 
exceptionalism—such as presidential power over treaty termination—should 
perhaps also end.  Now that treaties have increased implications for domestic 
 
31. E.g., Bradley, Foreign Affairs, supra note 5, at 1104–05. 
32. E.g., Bradley, supra note 1, at 823 (accepting that the best description of the current state of 
constitutional law is that the President can terminate treaties without congressional approval if this 
termination accords with international law); id. at 827, 830 (declining to address normative 
implications). 
33.  Bradley, Foreign Affairs, supra note 5, at 1105. 
34. See Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012).  The concurring opinion of Justice 
Sotomayor and the dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer do cite Goldwater v. Carter and note the 
foreign affairs context.  See id. at 1433 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 1437 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
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affairs (and now that at least some international agreements are done through 
ex post congressional–executive agreements that are akin to statutes), 
perhaps it is more important than formerly to have congressional sanction for 
their termination. 
These issues await the future.  Professor Bradley’s excellent article 
reminds us that constitutional practice can change dramatically, at least in the 
foreign affairs context.  It remains to be seen whether such a change will 
affect how foreign relations law itself is understood within our broader 
constitutional structure. 
